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ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
     Terminal Industrial Corporation and Mount Corporation (hereinafter 
jointly 
referred to as Terminal) owns several warehouses in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.  
Terminal leased the eighth floor of one of the warehouses as a restaurant 
and night club to 
Eighth Floor, Inc.  Subsequently, Terminal leased the ground floor of an 
adjacent 
warehouse it owned to Nufab Corporation, trading as Gothum (hereinafter 
Gothum), also 
as a night club.  Gothum staged special events which allegedly attracted 
large and unruly 
crowds of young people that rendered Eighth Floor's premises inaccessible 
to its patrons 
and severely and adversely affected its business.  Eighth Floor filed a 
complaint in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, charging Gothum with 
creating and 
maintaining a nuisance that interfered with Eighth Floor's use of its 
leased premises and 
the development of its business.  The complaint sought injunctive relief 
and damages 
from Gothum and Terminal. 
     Unionamerica Insurance Company, LTD. (Unionamerica or insurer), a 
foreign 
corporation, had issued a commercial general liability policy (Policy) to 
Gothum and 
Diamond Insurance Company (Diamond) had also insured Gothum.  When Diamond 
requested Unionamerica to assume partial responsibility to defend and for 
any potential 
liability, Unionamerica applied to the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend 
under the policy 
and that the allegations in the Eighth Floor complaint in the state court 
were beyond the 
scope of the terms of the general liability policy.  Unionamerica also 
asserted that 
coverage for the allegations in the underlying complaint was excluded by 
various 
exceptions in the policy.  The District Court granted Unionamerica's 
motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that the Eighth Floor alleged only one incident 
that occurred 
during the applicable policy period, which incident was excluded from 
coverage by the 
"Assault and Battery Endorsement."  We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
 
                               I. 
     Before we review the propriety of the District Court's decision 
entering summary 
judgment for the insurer, we consider the threshold question whether the 
District Court 
should have exercised jurisdiction over these declaratory judgment 
proceedings.  The 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.  2201 empowers federal courts to 
grant 
declaratory relief and this court has emphasized that the exercise of this 
declaratory relief 
power is discretionary.  State Auto Ins. Co. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131,133 
(3d Cir. 2000); 
Terra Nova Ins. Co., Ltd. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1222 (3d Cir. 
1989).   
     Eighth Floor, on appeal, advances several strong reasons why the 
District Court 
should not have exercised jurisdiction and that the exercise amounted to 
an abuse of 
discretion.  It points to the absence of any federal question or interest 
in this litigation, 
that the issue is one of state law, that the underlying proceedings are 
pending for trial in 
the state court, and that the court there had pending before it a 
proceeding for a 
declaratory judgment by the insurer, Diamond.  We are also reminded that 
the 
proceedings in this court unnecessarily compel Eighth Floor to litigate in 
both the state 
court and in the federal court.  Although the reasons asserted are 
persuasive, they 
regrettably were not raised in the District Court.  In light of the 
discretionary power of the 
District Court and the failure to raise objections in the District Court, 
we conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction.  
 
                              II. 
     The major issue raised by Eighth Floor on its appeal concerns the 
entry of 
summary judgment by the District Court in favor of the insurer.  Eighth 
Floor's state 
court complaint alleges, inter alia, that Gothum, having initially 
operated its night club in 
a generally acceptable and responsible manner, thereafter changed its 
front entrance 
making it adjacent to the entrance to Eighth Floor and "appealed to a 
young and unruly 
clientele who could only be controlled by the presence of large numbers of 
police and 
private security personnel" which the defendants never provided.  Eighth 
Floor also 
alleged that it sought Gothum's cooperation to redesign its entrance and 
create a safety 
zone for Eighth Floor's patrons and employees to gain access to and egress 
from its 
leased premises but the defendants rejected such proposals.   
     Eighth Floor further alleged that: (1) "[e]mployees and patrons of 
Eighth Floor 
have regularly been subjected to harassment, intimidation, name calling 
and the sheer 
negative impact of the extremely large crowds of largely uncontrolled 
people ranging 
generally in age from about 21 to 26 years of age"; and (2) "[w]ith as 
many as 1,000 
patrons waiting outside during a performance, the crowds have quickly 
become 
uncontrolled, and there have been many fights, pushing and shoving, open 
drinking and 
incidents of improper behavior, with insults and name calling to patrons 
of the Eighth 
Floor when they attempted to gain entrance to Eighth Floor."  As an 
illustration only of 
such behavior, Eighth Floor alleged that on August 4, 1995, a Gothum 
patron approached 
the front door of Eighth Floor "waving a gun and verbally threatened" one 
of its 
employees and on August 9, 1997, three Eighth Floor patrons were "gunned 
down by a 
patron of Gothum."   
     In entering summary judgment for the insurer, Unionamerica, the 
District Court 
found that the sole incident raised in the underlying state court action 
during the policy's 
coverage period was excluded by the Assault & Battery Exclusion of the 
policy.  
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, . . . show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Our review of the grant of summary judgment is plenary 
and we apply 
the same standard as the lower court should have applied.  Chisolm v. 
McManimon, 275 
F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2001); Lighting Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153, 1167 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  In conducting such a review, the facts are viewed in the 
light most favorable 
to the non-moving party and the non-moving party is entitled to all 
reasonable inferences. 
Chisolm, 275 F.3d at 321. 
     Both sides agree that Pennsylvania law governs the interpretation of 
the insurance 
policy.  An interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law 
for the court.  
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 
Standard 
Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 
1983)).  
Further, both sides acknowledge that in the insurance context, two 
separate duties   duty 
to defend and duty to indemnify   exist.  Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 533 
A.2d 1363, 1368 (Pa. 1987) ("The duty to defend is a distinct obligation, 
separate and 
apart from the insurer's duty to provide coverage.").  However, "[a]n 
insurer has a duty to 
indemnify its insured only if it is established that the insured's damages 
are actually 
within the policy coverage."  Lucker Mfg., A Unit of Amclyde Engineered 
Products, Inc. 
v. The Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 821 (3d Cir. 1994).  Thus, there must 
be a duty to 
defend before there is a duty to indemnify.   
     Under the governing law, an insurance company is obligated to defend 
an insured 
     whenever the allegations in a complaint filed against the insured 
potentially fall 
     within the policy's coverage. This duty to defend remains with the 
insurer until 
     facts sufficient to confine the claims to liability not within the 
scope of the policy 
     become known to the insurer. 
      
Id. at 813 (citations omitted).  Before considering whether there is a 
duty to defend, 
however, under Pennsylvania law, the coverage of the policy is determined 
first.  Id. at 
813-14 (citing Erie Ins. Exch., 533 A.2d at 1368) (construing terms of 
policy first and 
then determining if facts alleged in complaint if proven would come within 
policy scope 
as construed). 
     Unionamerica contends that the Policy does not cover any of the 
allegations 
asserted in the underlying state complaint.  It boldly asserts that 
"Eighth Floor makes no 
allegations against [Gothum] of . . . property damage that fall within the 
Policy's 
definition."  The Policy, however, and this Court's decision in Lucker are 
to the contrary.  
The Policy provides coverage not only for bodily injury and personal 
injury, but also for 
commercial property loss, and of most relevance here, property damage.  
Property 
damage is defined in the Policy as: 
          a.   Physical injury to tangible property, including all 
resulting loss of use of 
          that property.  All such loss shall be deemed to occur at the 
time of the 
          physical injury that caused it; or 
          b.   Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically 
injured.  All such loss 
          of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the "occurrence" 
that caused 
          it. 
      
(emphasis added).    
     Eighth Floor contends that it sustained property loss because Gothum 
created a 
nuisance that denied its employees and more importantly, its patrons of 
the use of the 
business premises.  This, in turn, undermined Eighth Floor's ability to 
sell its products, i.e 
food, beverages and entertainment to its customers.  In interpreting a 
similar "loss of use" 
provision in a Pennsylvania insurance contract, this Court held that "loss 
of use" included 
lost non-physical or economic use of the property.  Lucker, 23 F.3d at 
814-18, 815 n.6.   
     Next, we must determine whether the allegations in the complaint 
filed against the 
insured Gothum potentially fall within the Policy's coverage.  Id. at 814.  
The District 
Court held that coverage was not triggered because the sole incident 
alleged, an assault on 
an Eighth Floor employee, in the underlying complaint occurring during 
Unionamerica's 
coverage period was excluded by the Assault and Battery Exclusion.  
Further, it reasoned 
that "as there is no evidence pled of any question that specifically 
existed during the 
pendency of this insurance policy, the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment must be 
granted." 
     The District Court, however, seems to have seized on the illustrative 
incident set 
forth in the complaint as indicative of the nature of the entire 
complaint.  The allegations 
to which we have referred above unequivocally allege a nuisance claim.  
The complaint 
alleges that the conduct at issue was ongoing from 1993 through 1997.  The 
allegations in 
the complaint at the very least potentially fall within the policy's 
coverage and obligate 
the insurance company to defend.  "This [obligation] to defend remains 
with the insurer 
until facts sufficient to confine the claims to liability not within the 
scope of the policy 
become known to the insurer."  Id. at 813.  We are also not persuaded on 
the present 
record that the Expected/Intended Injury Exclusion relieves Unionamerica 
from its duty 
to defend.  Thus, in light of the result we reach, we do not decide the 
question of the duty 
to indemnify and leave it for the District Court to address on a more 
developed record. 
 
                              III. 
     In summary, the District Court committed no error in exercising 
jurisdiction.  
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the entry of summary 
judgment.   The 
judgment will be reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court for 
further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  Costs taxed against the 
appellee.
                              
TO THE CLERK: 
 




                                     /s/ Max Rosenn                    
                                     Circuit Judge 
